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The Implications of Kelley 
from the Defense's 
Perspective 
I na landmark decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has ruled in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., that 
manufacturers and marketers of "small, 
cheap handguns sometimes referred to as 
Saturday Night Specials, regularly used in 
criminal activity" may be held "absolutely" 
liable for an innocent person's gunshot in-
juries caused by a third party's criminal 
use of the product. This will be true not 
because "such" handguns are "unreason-
ably dangerous" within the meaning of 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts or because the manufacturing of 
handguns is "abnormally dangerous or ul-
trahazardous activity" within the meaning 
of Sections 519-520 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, but because in the 
court's view the society of Maryland be-
speaks a policy that justifies the creation of 
a cause of action that will impose such ab-
solute liability upon the manufacturers and 
marketers of "such" handguns. The deci-
sion is prospective in the sense that such 
a handgun must have had a retail sale to a 
member of the public after the date of the 
mandate on the Kelley decision. 
With regard to the apparent object of 
the judicially sculpted cause of action, 
the court, interestingly, acknowledges that 
"there is no clear-cut established definition 
of a Saturday Night Special, although there 
are various characteristics which are con-
sidered in placing a handgun into that cate-
gory." The court does recite "relevant fac-
tors" to be considered by the trier of fact 
(virtually always going to be a jury) in de-
termining whether the conceptual prereq-
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uisites for this cause of action have been 
met: "barrel length, concealability, cost, 
quality of materials, quality of manufac-
ture, accuracy, reliability, whether it has 
been banned from import by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and other 
related characteristics." As might be ex-
pected, this recitation closely resembles a 
dictionary definition of a Saturday Night 
Special-i.e., "any small, cheap, short-
barreled handgun that is readily available, 
and that is also lightweight and easily 
hidden". 
Critically, it is precisely this definitional 
situation which poses the dilemma for 
manufacturers and marketers of handguns 
in view of the impreciseness with which a 
product liability case proceeds to decision 
before a jury. In short, product liability 
cases, such as what will evolve here, often 
involve severe injuries tied to the use of a 
particular product and, therefore, proceed 
within a courtroom environment where 
there is strong sympathy for the party sus-
taining the injuries (here, it will by defini-
tion always be an innocent victim of crim-
inal activity). This environment is then 
enhanced by a recitation oflaw by the trial 
judge for purposes of the deliberative pro-
cess that renders a finding ofliability rela-
tively easy. Accordingly, when also inject-
ing the human element reflected in studies 
that most jurors are pre-conditioned to 
think that on balance it will hurt a cor-
porate defendant linsurer far less to award 
something to the injured person than to 
turn that person away with nothing, the 
Kelley decision's message is almost certain 
to have the effect of not only precluding 
the manufacture and distribution of the 
type of handgun known as a Saturday 
Night Special but also precluding in due 
time most types of handguns. Of course, 
that result might have been the unwritten 
intent of the opinion's author. 
Legally speaking, the court in Kelley has 
created a cause of action which will be ar-
ticulated to jurors for decision-making 
purposes along the following lines: 
You are charged under Maryland law 
that a (manufacturer) (seller) of a Sat-
urday Night Special type of handgun 
which he knows or reasonably should 
know is principally to be used for 
[criminal activity] [or] [activity which 
has little or no legitimate (use) (value) 
in today's society] is responsible for in-
juries caused by persons who use that 
product for [criminal] [or] [an activity 
which has little or no legitimate (use) 
(value) in today's society]. In decid-
ing whether a handgun is a Saturday 
Night Special type, you should con-
sider the following factors: (recitation 
of aforementioned factors). 
As a result, the Kelley decision has the 
"legitimate" handgun industry reeling be-
cause of the practical implication of being 
held liable for injuries resulting from the 
criminal misuse of "legitimate" handguns. 
The "legitimate" handgun industry has no 
difficulty with being subjected to the tra-
ditional product liability theories even 
within the context of their rapid evolution 
- that is, being held responsible for any 
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defect in the handgun itself, such as hav-
ing a safety mechanism that fails under cer-
tain circumstances, or having a tendency 
to misfire, or having a trigger structure 
that easily catches on foreign objects and 
thereby causes an accidental discharge. It 
simply quarrels with the judicial policy-
making that will hold it responsible for a 
third party's deliberate misuse of its prod-
uct. As an aside, statistics of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms seem to 
suggest that criminals prefer to use high 
quality .38 and .357 caliber revolvers (the 
same type of handgun as used by police 
organizations) over the so-called Saturday 
Night Special in any event. To add an-
other dimension, the underpinning ra-
tionale for the Kelley decision suggests 
that there may be room in the cause of ac-
tion for other types of analogous instru-
mentalities-e.g., a sawed-ofT shotgun or 
the switchblade knife. Only time will tell, 
however! 
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Hamilton v. State 
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ual is taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom by the authorities in 
any significant way and is subjected to 
questioning.'" Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 
609,490 A.2d at 766 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436,478 (1966)). Thus, the court reasoned 
that in order to find a violation of Miranda, 
it must be found "(a) that appellant was in-
terrogated; (b) that the interrogation oc-
curred while he was in custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom; and (c) that 
appellant was not properly advised of his 
Miranda rights." Hamilton, 62 Md. App. 
at 609, 490 A.2d at 766. 
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The court quickly found that the ac-
quaintance's conversations with the de-
fendant amounted to an interrogation be-
cause he was an agent of the state sent 
expressly to question the defendant about 
the murder. Additionally, it is clear that 
the defendant was not properly advised of 
his Miranda rights. However, the second 
element, that of custody, was missing. 
"Only if the accused is in a situation 
where there are inherently compelling 
pressures to respond to interrogation are 
Miranda warnings required." Hamilton, 
62 Md. App. at 611, 490 A.2d at 767. The 
court discussed the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293 (1966) in reaching its decision. In that 
case the Court held that the use of testi-
mony of a government informer concern-
ing conversations between the informer 
and the defendant did not violate the de-
fendant's fifth amendment rights. "[S]ince 
at least as long as 1807, when ChiefJustice 
Marshall first gave attention to the matter 
in the trial of Aaron Burr, all have agreed 
that a necessary element of compulsory 
self-incrimination is some kind of compul-
sion .... " /d. at 304 (footnote omitted), 
quoted in Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 612, 
490 A.2d at 767. The conversations in 
Hoffa, however, took place in the defen-
dant's hotel suite and not in a jail cell. 
Judge Alpert then turned to the Court's 
decision in United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264 (1980). 
[T]he Supreme Court, while holding 
that statements made to a police in-
formant after indictment of the ac-
cused and while the accused was incar-
cerated were inadmissible on Sixth 
Amendment grounds, addressed Fifth 
Amendment concerns in dicta. Citing 
Hoffa for authority, the Court noted 
that "the Fifth Amendment has not 
been held to be implicated by the use 
of undercover Government agents be-
fore charges are filed because of the ab-
sence of the potential of compulsion." 
Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 613, 490 A.2d 
at 768 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 272). 
Although the environment involved in 
Hamilton, namely the confines of a prison 
cell, leads to thoughts of custody, the court 
concluded that there was nothing coercive 
in the casual questioning of Hamilton by 
Fowler. The court noted that Hamilton 
"spoke with Fowler of his own volition, 
was not required to stay and continue the 
conversation and could have left Fowler at 
any time." Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 615, 
490 A.2d at 769. The court cautioned that 
"[w]e must not forget that 'Miranda . .. 
was aimed not at self-crimination generally 
. . . but at compelled self-incrimination-
the inherent coercion of the custodial, in-
communicado, third-degree questioning 
process.'" Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 616, 
490 A.2d at 769 (quoting Cummings v. 
State, 27 Md. App. 361, 364, 341 A.2d 
294,297, cert. denied, 276 Md. 740 (1975)). 
Thus, the court concluded "that despite 
appellant's incarceration the interrogation 
was not custodial." Hamilton, at 615, 490 
A.2d at 769. 
Before Hamilton, the "jail plant" situa-
